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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to protect the national economy from the economic burden created by 
the expanding cost of healthcare, Congress enacted legislation under the Commerce 
Clause1 to compel or mandate specific people to engage in the economic activity of 
purchasing health insurance.2  On June 28, 2012, four months after the primary focus 
of my Article was written, the Supreme Court held in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius3 that the federal mandate to buy private health 
insurance in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is an 
unconstitutional exercise of the power of Congress to regulate Commerce. The 
individual mandate violates the Commerce Clause because it does not regulate 
existing commercial activity.4 The mandate compels individuals to become active in 
commerce by buying a product, on the basis that their failure to do so affects 
                                                          
* Associate Dean, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., 
University of Mississippi. I would like to thank my Research Assistant, Brenda Dang, J.D. 
Candidate 2012, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, for her helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this article. I am grateful to my wife and my children for their moral support while I 
worked on this article. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 3 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). 
 4 Id. at 2587.  
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interstate commerce.5 Interpreting the Commerce Clause to allow Congress to 
regulate individuals specifically because they are doing nothing would release a new 
and potentially unlimited domain to congressional authority.6   
PPACA’s compulsion that particular individuals pay a financial penalty for not 
acquiring health insurance may reasonably be described as a tax.7  Since the 
Constitution authorizes such a tax, it is not the role of the Supreme Court to forbid it, 
or to decide its wisdom or fairness.8  Because the Federal Government does not have 
the power to command people to buy health insurance under the Commerce Clause, 
Section 5000A’s individual mandate is not a valid exercise of the Commerce Power 
by Congress. However, Congress does have the power to impose a tax on those 
without health insurance and, therefore, the individual mandate is a valid and 
constitutional exercise of the power of Congress under the Taxing Clause.9 
The Obama administration contends the individual mandate is “absolutely 
intertwined” with PPACA provisions prohibiting insurers from rejecting applicants 
as well as prohibiting insurers from taking into account an applicant’s pre-existing 
conditions.10 The fundamental focus of this Article is whether the decision not to buy 
individual health insurance as required by Congress also qualifies as valid economic 
activity under the Commerce Clause. This question before the Court continues the 
modern battle regarding the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, 
and the battle regarding the regulation of economic activity continues, irrespective of 
the Supreme Court decision regarding PPACA, because of the continuing impact of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Lopez.11  
In Lopez, the Court held that because a Gun Free School Zone Law went beyond 
the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, it was 
unconstitutional.12 In a dissenting opinion in Lopez, Justice Souter correctly warned 
that it would be a serious mistake to think of the Supreme Court’s holding as an 
insignificant event in Commerce Clause law.13 Justice Souter appropriately 
articulated a position saying that the holding in Lopez could be the foundation for a 
substantial rollback of the commerce power that could endanger a world of federal 
commerce power, which his generation had continuously experienced.14 However, 
Professor Richard Primus argues that the day of the big commerce clause rollback 
has not come.15 From both a doctrinal and political perspective, all the drama 
                                                          
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 2600. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 2601. 
 10 Id.  
 11 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 12 See id.  
 13 Richard Primus, How the Gun-Free School Zones Act Saved the Individual Mandate, 
110 MICH. L. Rev. 44, 50-51 (2012). 
 14 Id. at 51. 
 15 Id. 
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regarding the Supreme Court’s applicability of the Commerce Clause to PPACA is 
about whether now is the right time for the federal judiciary to rollback the 
commerce clause power of Congress.16 
The fact that the Supreme Court initially scheduled five and a half hours of oral 
arguments in place of the standard one-hour is evidence of the significance of 
PPACA case, and the Court’s judgment, only a few months afterwards, offered 
many insights and challenges to the presidential contenders and candidates in the 
fight for power in Congress.17 The Obama White House, which requested the 
Supreme Court to review the case immediately as opposed to later, contended that 
the challenges to the PPACA and its individual mandates are similar to those that 
confronted Social Security, the Civil Rights Act, and other very important parts of 
progressive social legislation.18 The Supreme Court then announced on December 
19, 2011 that it scheduled three days in March of 2012 to consider arguments that 
challenged the constitutionality of PPACA.19  
On March 26, 2012, the Court proceeded by listening to arguments involving the 
issue of whether the federal Anti-Injunction Act creates a situation where a court 
dispute regarding the individual mandate, like the one within PPACA, is an untimely 
challenge if brought prior to 2015.20 The court scheduled two hours on March 27, 
2012 to hear arguments on the most important issue in the litigation –whether 
Congress went beyond its constitutional authority by compelling most Americans 
under PPACA’s individual mandate to buy health insurance or opt out of buying 
health insurance and be assessed a fee.21 The Court scheduled arguments involving 
two issues for March 28, 2012.22 Initially, the Court contemplated for ninety minutes 
whether PPACA’s individual mandate can be segregated from the rest of PPACA.23 
Next, the Court scheduled an hour of argument on March 28, 2012 to determine 
whether Congress may enlarge the size and range of Medicaid.24 The dominant and 
most plausible explanation for the Supreme Court granting five and one-half hours 
for three consecutive days in March 2012 for oral arguments regarding the 
constitutionality of the PPACA is because the Court is seriously considering how to 
justify a rollback of enumerated commerce power of Congress on an issue of market 
place social justice.   
                                                          
 16 Id. at 44. 
 17 See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case as Race Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/us/supreme-court-to-hear-case-
challenging-health-law.html?pagewanted=all. 
 18 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Obama’s Health-Care Overhaul, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-
challenge-to-obamas-health-care-overhaul/2011/11/11/gIQALTvrKN_story.html. 
 19 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Health Care Case in Late March, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2011, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/supreme-court-to-hear-health-
care-case-in-late-march/?nl=us&emc=politicsemailema4. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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PPACA requires an individual, under specific circumstances, to either purchase 
health insurance or make a payment for a failure to acquire health insurance.25 
Professor Mark Hall contends the more convincing arguments in the individual 
mandate battle support the conclusion that a congressional directive that encourages 
individuals to obtain healthcare insurance is a permissible regulation of Congress’s 
commerce power under the Commerce Clause.26 The Commerce Clause allows 
Congress to regulate the economic marketplace involving the commercial enterprise 
of healthcare insurance coverage or healthcare services.27 In U.S. v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court articulated that “[n]o commercial 
enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to 
be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.”28 The interstate market 
for individual healthcare coverage without an individual mandate, and regulated 
under state and local laws, creates an undue burden on the national economy.29 
Therefore, an individual’s decision not to purchase healthcare coverage through an 
insurance policy should be treated as a commercial enterprise.30   
Congress may utilize its historical regulatory power under the Commerce Clause 
to eradicate the undue burden on the national economy created by requiring all 
American’s to purchase healthcare insurance that contains an individual mandate.31 
The requirement to purchase healthcare insurance coverage or to pay a fee to the 
government helps to control costs of healthcare in the interstate market by increasing 
the pool of healthy, insured individuals.32  The Supreme Court’s duty when it applied 
the Commerce Clause to PPACA was to keep the power to regulate interstate 
commercial risks among the states in the hands of Congress, because the power to 
regulate interstate commercial risks “is vested in the Congress, available to be 
exercised for the national welfare as Congress shall deem necessary.”33 For one to 
refuse to purchase healthcare insurance is in reality a commercial venture because 
that individual’s decision cannot be separated from an aggregate burden on the 
national healthcare service market.34 Under the rationale of United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association, Congress may use its Commerce Clause power to 
                                                          
 25 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 242 
(2010). 
 26 See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1825, 1828 (2011). 
 27 See generally, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 
(1944) (holding Congress may utilize its power under the commerce clause to regulate the 
insurance industry). 
 28 Id. at 553. 
 29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 242 
(2010). 
 30 Id. at 242-43. 
 31 See id. at 244. 
 32 See id. at 243. 
 33 Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 552-53. 
 34 See id. at 552. 
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regulate the healthcare insurance market, and therefore promoting national welfare in 
healthcare services by making healthcare more affordable under PPACA.35  
The collective impact of the refusal to purchase health insurance in the healthcare 
market creates an undue burden on the national economy.36 Since 1824, the Supreme 
Court in Gibbons v. Ogden understood the regulatory nature of the Commerce 
Clause power vested by the Constitution to Congress, giving Congress the power to 
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed for the purpose of protecting 
our national economy.37 Because the individual health insurance mandate 
requirement is a plausible means of protecting our national economy, the regulatory 
power of the Commerce Clause allows Congress to prescribe the rules by which 
healthcare service is to be paid for by individuals.38 A reasonable interpretation of 
the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in United States v. Darby39 strongly 
suggests that the individual healthcare mandate issue presented under PPACA is 
neither original nor fresh.40 In Darby, the Supreme Court again articulated its 
historically correct view that the Commerce Clause granted Congress complete 
power to regulate conditions involving interstate transportation and other situations 
that place an unnecessary burden on the national economy.41  Under this power, 
Congress has the authority to protect items involved in interstate commerce from 
unfair economic competition by expressly regulating the wages and hours paid to 
employees.42   
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is so extensive that it is only 
limited by the Constitution itself.43 One group of commentators challenges the lower 
courts’ conclusion in both Virginia and Florida that PPACA’s individual mandate 
requirement exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause.44 The Virginia 
and Florida lower courts (1) failed to adequately identify the “market” that Congress 
intended to impact, (2) did not understand the expansive public health policy 
objectives generated by PPACA, and (3) created unnecessary uncertainty regarding 
Congress’s authority to act in the best interest of an individual involving public 
health issues.45 Additionally, Professor Randy E. Barnett contends PPACA’s 
individual responsibility requirement is unconstitutional because Congress cannot 
                                                          
 35 See id. at 552-53. 
 36 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 242-44 
(2010). 
 37 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 96 (1824). 
 38 Id.  
 39 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  
 40 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010).    
 41 Darby, 312 U.S. at 114.  
 42 Id.   
 43 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 75. 
 44 James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Congress, Courts, and Commerce: Upholding the Individual 
Mandate to Protect the Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED & ETHICS 394, 398 (2011). 
 45 Id.  
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exercise its power over interstate commerce, even when attached to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause requiring people to undertake the economic activity of buying 
health insurance from a private business or paying a fee for failure to do so.46 A 
decision to buy health insurance or not to buy health insurance is by its very nature 
an intellectual economic activity. However, under the individual mandate provision 
of PPACA,47 Congress makes available a forum for economic activity by presenting 
a person with an opportunity to make an economic decision about whether to 
purchase healthcare insurance.48 
In one case challenging the individual mandate provision of PPACA, a federal 
court in Michigan accepted the government’s argument that the provision “regulates 
economic decisions regarding the way in which healthcare services are paid for.”49 
Since an economic decision to buy or not to buy healthcare insurance requires 
intellectual activity regarding the healthcare market, the argument that no activity 
has taken place when an individual does not buy healthcare insurance should be 
rejected.50  The assertion that a court is required to engage in a highly abstract line of 
reasoning to support the conclusion that the economic decision not to purchase 
insurance is a definite intellectual economic activity is not valid.51 Intellectual 
activity involving the decision to buy or not to buy healthcare insurance is an 
example of an economic decision, which the Commerce Clause allows Congress to 
regulate under PPACA.52 
The major goal of PPACA is to decrease the number of Americans without 
healthcare insurance and the growing economic price tag they inflict on the 
healthcare system when not covered.53  Since the prevailing purpose of PPACA’s 
individual mandate54 is to decrease the burden on the national healthcare marketplace 
and national economy from the millions of uninsured Americans, PPACA is a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.55 Under the Commerce Clause, 
Congress has the ability to regulate those activities of the uninsured that substantially 
affect the interstate healthcare marketplace.56  Congress’s legislative intent to bring 
down the cost of health insurance, increase coverage, and trim down uncompensated 
care will be unworkable if the minimum coverage prerequisite, which commands all 
                                                          
 46 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 606 (2010). 
 47 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010).  
 48 Id.  
 49 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D.Mich. 2010). 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. at 894.  
 53 Id. at 893.  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
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United States citizens, not specifically exempt to keep “minimum essential 
coverage” healthcare, is not permitted to commence in 2014.57   
Congress established that the individual mandate is a necessary component of a 
much larger regulation of economic activity and that its nonexistence would chip 
away at federal regulation of the health insurance market.58 The rationale of 
Gonzalez v. Raich59 establishes that the individual mandate requirement is a valid 
exercise of the Commerce Clause power by Congress. There are many good reasons 
for Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause power to reduce the economic 
burdens created in the healthcare marketplace; particularly, the millions of uninsured 
Americans who increase the cost of healthcare services for all.60 PPACA’s individual 
mandate requirement should be regarded as a constitutionally permissible attempt to 
eliminate the undue burden on interstate healthcare created by uninsured 
Americans.61 Although a person’s activity may only consists of one’s economic 
decision not to purchase healthcare insurance, it still may be regulated by Congress 
if such a decision exerts a substantial economic impact on the interstate health 
insurance market.62 
Part II of this Article contends that the decision not to purchase health insurance 
is not to be treated as an economic activity because it is not connected to economic 
risk-taking should be rejected outright as nothing more than a denial of the economic 
reality at a practical interactive marketplace level.63 Part III of this Article provides 
an analysis of the individual mandate as a Commerce Clause issue, with a focus 
particularly on a case from Florida, objecting to the 2010 healthcare overhaul law as 
unconstitutional, which on November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court agreed to hear.64  
Three different courts had urged the Supreme Court to review the essential issue 
concerning the power of Congress to invoke PPACA’s individual mandate.65  Since 
the 11th Circuit was the only court to hold the individual mandate unconstitutional, 
the Supreme Court may have been persuaded to hear the cases from that circuit.66  
Part III discusses why the Supreme Court should have reversed the conclusion from 
the District Court in Florida that the individual health insurance mandate is 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.   
 
 
                                                          
 57 Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 886. 
 58 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).   
 59 Id. at 32-33. 
 60 Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 893. 
 61 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010).   
 62 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
 63 Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 893.  
 64 Liptak, supra note 17. 
 65 Liptak, supra note 17. 
 66 Liptak, supra note 17. 
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II.  THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DECISION NOT TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE IS 
NOT TO BE TREATED AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BECAUSE IT IS NOT CONNECTED 
TO ECONOMIC RISK-TAKING SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A DENIAL OF ECONOMIC 
REALITY AT THE PRACTICAL INTERACTIVE MARKETPLACE LEVEL 
The thrust of the argument against the constitutional validity of PPACA is that 
Congress lacks the authority under the Commerce Clause to require individuals to 
purchase health insurance or subject them to a tax.67 Twenty-seven state Attorneys 
General argued that Congress could not, under the Commerce Clause, command 
people to purchase health insurance because it is not connected or linked to 
economic risk-taking.68  This argument should be rejected as a denial of economic 
reality at the practical interactive marketplace level.69 The decision to pay for 
medical expenses either through health insurance or at the occurrence of an event 
requiring medical care is, in fact, economic activity.70  Congress appropriately 
concluded that the individual mandate was a necessary and essential component of 
regulating economic activity for health insurance. Without PPACA’s individual 
mandate, a person could destabilize the federal supervision of the health insurance 
market by delaying the decision to pay for health insurance until she considered care 
necessary.71 If an individual can delay her decision to purchase health insurance 
without the economic burden of an increased premium expense when she is sick, this 
will defeat PPACA’s goal of lowering the cost of health insurance premiums.72 But 
with the individual mandate, insurance companies can maintain lower premiums 
with an increased pool of insureds, therefore, accomplishing PPACA’s goal.73   
Robert Peck correctly asserts that PPACA’s individual mandate is a practical 
means of making insurance coverage economically feasible, as insurance companies 
can no longer deny coverage based on an individual’s pre-existing health situation.74 
PPACA requires health insurers to offer coverage without increased rates for 
individuals with pre-existing health conditions.75 Because of this, Congress rationally 
concluded that insurance companies would only remain economically profitable if 
PPACA commanded virtually every American to pay for some form of health 
insurance coverage.76 Only Americans unable to obtain insurance due to their 
                                                          
 67 Hodge et al., supra note 44, at 394. 
 68 Hodge et al., supra note 44, at 394. 
 69 Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 893.  
 70 Id. 
 71 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(A)(LexisNexis 2012). 
 72 § 18091(2)(I). 
 73 Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 139, 
154 (2011). 
 74 Robert S. Peck, Understanding the Constitutional Challenges to Federal Health Care 
Reform, THE BRIEF, Summer 2011, at 28. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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financial situation are free from this obligation.77 Starting in 2014, Americans who 
do not acquire the minimum health insurance will be charged a fee equivalent to the 
larger of $95 or 1 percent of their income equal to the price of an essential health 
insurance plan. This fee is to be subtracted from any tax refund owed to that 
individual.78 By 2016, the involuntary coverage price of the insurance will rise to 
$695 for each adult, or a total of 2.5 percent of income.79 
Allison K. Hoffman argues that PPACA’s individual mandate is designed to 
allow the government to achieve universal coverage while avoiding any basic 
reformation of the present payment and delivery systems.80  Basically, PPACA will 
not alter or transform the mainly private distribution of healthcare due to some 
combination of public and private financing.81 The government's primary function 
under PPACA is to serve as a vehicle for promoting universal coverage.82 PPACA 
establishes a structure that is similar to Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. 
In those countries, each individual’s involvement in the country’s healthcare 
insurance coverage is required and insurance is managed by private organizations 
and financed from a combination of public and private funds.83  
However, because PPACA’s goal of achieving universal coverage is based on 
actuarially-rated commercial insurance, to which its purpose is profit and not a 
universal right to have access to health care, the universal healthcare goal will more 
than likely be sacrificed in favor of profits.84 This contradiction presents enough 
problems to keep the individual mandate requirement of PPACA from being utilized 
as an effective tool for reaching a goal of universal coverage.85 The basis of 
considerable disagreement concerning the individual mandate under PPACA is 
whether it will fail to achieve universal coverage.86 The requirement under PPACA 
to purchase health insurance has produced energetic discussions about the regulatory 
reach of the Commerce Clause.87  
PPACA’s passage created an array of political emotions.88 When PPACA was 
enacted into law it was a very partisan event.89 The Senate passed PPACA on 
                                                          
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, 
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 15 (2010). 
 81 Id. at 15-16. 
 82 Id. at 16. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Scott Lindstrom, Comment, Health Care Reform and Rural America: The Effect of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act On the Rural Economy and Rural Health, 47 
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 644 (2011). 
 87 Elizabeth J. Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 249 (2011). 
 88 Id. 
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December 24, 2009, by a vote of 60-39, all Democrats and Independents voting to 
support it and all Republicans voting to oppose it.90 It was approved in the House of 
Representatives on March 21, 2010, by a vote of 219-212, although 178 Republicans 
and 34 Democrats did not support it.91 Almost immediately following PPACA’s 
approval, extensive ligation was filed, testing PPACA’s constitutionality under the 
Commerce Clause.92  Professor Wilson Huhn argued that PPACA’s individual 
mandate might present a significant problem regarding the constitutionality of the 
entire law.93 The goal of PPACA’s drafter’s was to expand access to healthcare by 
greatly decreasing the total number of uninsured persons.94 The Congressional 
Budget Office and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services report the 
PPACA will effectively make available health insurance coverage not previously 
had to between 32 to 34 million additional American citizens.95 PPACA is designed 
to manage the health insurance market in a manner to ensure specific minimum 
insurance protection to individuals.96 By expanding the number of insureds, the 
constitutional validity of PPACA’s “individual mandate,” or Minimum Essential 
Coverage Provision (MECP), is absolutely necessary if PPACA is to achieve the 
Congressional goal of expanding access to healthcare insurance.97 
Despite the fact that PPACA’s individual mandate was responsible for a great 
deal of the opposition in the Senate and House of Representatives to the legislation, 
the section’s endorsers were determined to keep the individual mandate in the law 
because it was viewed as the heart of the legislation, as a tool to regulate a 
dysfunctional healthcare insurance market.98 Professor Nan Hunter correctly asserts 
it would be economically infeasible in the healthcare insurance marketplace to 
increase individuals’ access to healthcare coverage without using the individual 
mandate as a tool to offset preexisting health condition discrimination.99 The 
practical effect of outlawing medical underwriting and discrimination because of 
pre-existing health conditions is to make the insurance market more available to 
individuals, regardless of each individual’s current health condition and increasing 
coverage to those with the greatest need.100 However, commanding insurers to accept 
high-risk beneficiaries at a reduced cost while not including a mandate that healthy 
                                                          
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 249-50. 
 92 Huhn, supra note 73, at 142. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 139. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1955, 1973 (2011). 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at 1975.  
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persons enroll in insurance pools would destroy the private marketplace by 
concurrently dropping premium income while raising payments.101  
Harold Pollack and Greg Anrig contend that President Obama could have 
announced PPACA as his single most significant domestic accomplishment in his 
2012 State of the Union address.102 PPACA without a doubt remains an extremely 
contentious and divisive law with results and expenditures pending for many years 
after its passage. The prevailing early evidence reveals that PPACA is currently 
enhancing the lives of millions of Americans just a few years after its enactment.103 
PPACA is encouraging as long-overdue basic changes in our dysfunctional 
healthcare structure was necessary.104  Even though PPACA does not take full effect 
until 2014, Harold Pollack and Greg Anrig  have identified five tangible areas where 
PPACA is already having an impact: (1) approximately 2.5 million additional young 
adults are now insured as a result of the new law; (2) senior Americans have greater 
prescription drug and preventive care coverage;(3) coverage is more accessible for 
those individuals with pre-existing conditions; (4) structural transformations are 
already building a more efficient healthcare procedure; and (5) the law encourages 
fairness, transparency, and integrity in the private healthcare insurance 
marketplace.105 Since PPACA transforms the essential business model of private 
healthcare insurance, the insurance industry will be unable to profit by cherry-
picking healthy customers or denying coverage to those individuals with preexisting 
conditions.106 Because the federal government under PPACA teams up with states in 
investigating insurance rate increases, some insurers have already amended or 
reversed big rate increases.107 
Although PPACA benefits millions of Americans, it is not an accident or 
coincidence that the requirement that all individuals purchase qualifying health 
coverage is the most controversial and contested aspect of the law by those opposed 
to any health insurance reform.108  The individual mandate is the primary focus of 
constitutional dispute regarding PPACA because it is the instrument by which the 
law accomplishes its goal of comprehensive and subsidized healthcare coverage.109 
The motivation for the individual mandate is easy to understand: it is the only 
method to make young, healthy persons, who habitually and voluntarily forego 
health insurance coverage, pay into the healthcare insurance structure in this manner, 
                                                          
 101 Id. 
 102 Harold Pollack & Greg Anrig, The Quiet Triumph of Obama Care, WASH. MONTHLY 
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-
square/2012/01/a_quiet_triumph_of_obama_care035079.php. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia’s Response to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 37, 50 (2010). 
 109 Id. at 50-51. 
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cross-subsidizing seniors and unhealthy individuals.110 If the Supreme Court opined 
that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and could not be upheld as a tax, 
PPACA would have financially crippled.  The individual mandate is absolutely 
necessary for PPACA to effectively produce the results intended by Congress and 
the drafters of the legislation.111  
Even though the Supreme Court has held the individual mandate in PPACA as 
imposing a permissible tax, the federal government may find it difficult to collect the 
penalties it imposes on violators.112 This difficulty exists because PPACA prohibits 
the placing of liens or levies on a taxpayer’s property if the individual does not pay 
the fee.113  The IRS may withhold an individuals tax refund if the individual fails to 
produce evidence that she is insured; however, this measure is not effective for those 
individuals not entitled to an adequate refund or any refund at all.114 For people not 
entitled to either an adequate tax refund or any tax refund, one commentator asserts 
that submission to PPACA’s individual mandate is effectively voluntary.115  
A private health insurance company’s level of profit is directly linked to how the 
insurance company is able to manage and redistribute its risks.116 PPACA 
significantly modifies how insurance companies may redistribute covered 
individuals’ risks by regulating how those risks are distributed.117 A risk class is 
created as an economic tool for sharing risks or risk pooling.118  Risk pooling is 
expanded when the insurance coverage and prices are comparable for the insured in 
a pool119 (e.g., in those situations where costs and coverage are not personalized 
because of a person’s risk).120  In the past, private health insurance was presented in 
three markets: big group (over 50 or 100 employees, varied by state), little group, 
and individual.121 All three markets made the redistribution of risks possible.122 The 
big group market traditionally distributed risks more comprehensively than the little 
group or the individual market.123 PPACA’s plain meaning and subject matter 
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promptly champions the argument that the individual mandate’s goal clearly 
includes regulation of insurers in the healthcare market.124 
Because PPACA views health insurance as a vehicle to redistribute risks in the 
insurance market, it wipes away the risk differences in the three insurance markets 
by commanding individuals to purchase private health insurance.125 As a result, each 
individual will become a member of a risk pool under the requirements of the 
individual mandate.126 One commentator believes that the primary purpose of 
PPACA’s individual mandate is to establish private-market healthcare reform that 
reflects more solidarity in the health insurance system.127  Professor Hoffman 
remarked, “[a] solidaristic [health insurance] system is one in which risks are pooled 
equally and broadly among healthy and sick insureds, resulting in ‘health 
redistribution,’ where the healthy help to shoulder the burden of medical care costs 
for the sick.”128 Americans committed  to furthering social justice in the United 
States should welcome PPACA’s individual mandate as a useful instrument to 
promote solidarity in the healthcare system where each of us can share the blessings 
of liberty by equally and broadly dividing our risks as our brothers’ keepers.129  Our 
perception of America’s national character influences whether we view PPACA’s 
individual mandate as doing the right thing130 because it helps to secure the 
advantages of liberty for millions of Americans who would otherwise be unable have 
access to healthcare.131 President Barack Obama urged Congress to enact healthcare 
reform for the reason that it is the right thing to do for the sake of our national 
conscience.132 While discussing the controversy surrounding PPACA, Professor Gina 
Rosoff appropriately said, “[t]he American national character influences what we 
attempt, how we go about it, and how likely we are to succeed.”133 
The plan for an individual mandate within healthcare reform in America began 
with Republican politicians, who had no problem with its constitutionality before 
President Barack Obama, a Democrat, campaigned on the issue when he was seeking 
election.134 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has expansive authority to 
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regulate products affecting interstate commerce, as individual health insurance 
coverage or the lack thereof was thought to effect commerce adequately enough to 
justify regulation. 135 The established economics of health insurance reveals that an 
individual mandate to acquire insurance is an essential part of regulating how health 
insurers price and offer their products on the market.136  
However, federal district courts in Virginia and Florida avoided the economic 
marketplace rationale for Commerce Clause regulatory scrutiny and held that 
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to force individuals to buy health 
insurance or pay a fee.137 Minutes after President Obama signed PPACA into law on 
March 23, 2010, a legal crusade against the law began with thirteen states, led by 
Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, asking federal courts across the country to 
declare that Congress lacked the authority under the  under the Commerce Clause 
when it enacted PPACA.138 For example, Virginia Attorney General Kenneth 
Cuccinelli took independent legal action in Virginia, with the state of Virginia as the 
only plaintiff, on grounds comparable to those states in the Florida litigation.139 At 
the heart of the Republican-led Florida lawsuit challenging PPACA was the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate.140 It appeared that Republicans had 
quickly forgotten that they were the creators of the individual mandate as a tool for 
healthcare reform.141   
Much of the commentary and litigation involving PPACA placed the individual 
mandate as the center of attention because of the intense belief by many that the 
individual mandate goes beyond the federal government’s enumerated power under 
the Commerce Clause.142 Those objecting to the individual mandate maintain that 
commanding all Americans to pay for privately-offered healthcare insurance is not 
only unconstitutional but extraordinary and wrong.143 Most observers predicted the 
constitutional validity of PPACA’s individual mandate would eventually be decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.144 The prediction became a reality on November 14, 
2011 when the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
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for the Eleventh Circuit was granted in Florida v. Department of Health and Human 
Services.145 
III.  ON NOVEMBER 14, 2011, THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED TO HEAR A CASE FROM 
FLORIDA  OBJECTING TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
REVERSE THE CONCLUSION  
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Department of 
Health and Human Services has been considered a political and constitutional 
blockbuster.146  The Court’s decision to become involved in the constitutional debate 
over PPACA was anticipated, as any federal court striking down an Act of Congress 
is almost certainly to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. One commentator believed 
that any ruling in the Supreme Court case will be of great assistance in identifying 
the constitutional standards of the Roberts court.147 Pam Bondi, Florida’s attorney 
general, said she appreciated the court’s quick decision to review the 11th Circuit’s 
opinion, in which Florida was the lead plaintiff.148  Ms. Bondi said, “we have urged 
swift judicial resolution because of the unprecedented threat that the individual 
mandate poses to the liberty of Americans simply because they live in this 
country.”149 Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the House Democratic 
leader, said an opinion from the Supreme Court approving PPACA and its individual 
mandate means that, consistent with the intent of Congress, “Americans will benefit 
from lower health care costs and greater access to high-quality medical care.”150   
The Supreme Court’s decision to review PPACA presents an interesting public 
policy question that is generating a great deal of attention in American politics.151 
Those opposed to PPACA, despite the Supreme Court eventually upholding the law, 
have successfully improperly framed the debate in the context of the constitutional 
limits of the government's power under the Commerce Clause.152 But, Congress has 
expansive power to regulate economic activity under the Commerce Clause as a 
matter of judgment.153  
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PPACA is valid under the Constitution because both the Commerce Clause and 
the political process authorize Congress to regulate both the cost of and access to 
healthcare.154 The political process is available to both the states and individuals as a 
check on congressional power to regulate the purchase of healthcare insurance as 
economic activity.155 PPACA inflames president Obama’s conservative opponents, 
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause reality because the law highlights one 
part of President Obama’s progressive domestic agenda.156 During the 2012 
presidential election, the Republican candidates made an energetic vow to take a part 
PPACA, which is now commonly coined: “Obamacare.” The Supreme Court’s 
opinion also sent a clearly identifiable message to the electorate when upholding 
PPACA during the 2012 presidential elections.157  
After President Obama signed PPACA, those individuals that antagonized by the 
Act rushed to dispute its constitutional validity in court.158 The initial court opinions 
demonstrated an obvious pattern, with federal district court judges chosen by 
Democratic presidents supporting the law and Republican appointees finding the Act 
unconstitutional.159 In an Eleventh Circuit judgment, Judge Frank Hull, who was 
appointed to his federal judgeship by Bill Clinton, united with a Republican judge in 
holding PPACA unconstitutional, arguing that the Act was too invasive.160 However, 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and D.C. Circuit, two well-known 
Republican-selected judges agreed that, although the PPACA is invasive, the Act is 
within the bounds of the powers granted to Congress under the constitution.161  
Although PPACA may appear invasive, the issue regarding the individual 
mandate of the Act is more of a political issue than a serious issue regarding the 
constitutional limitations on the Commerce Clause.162 PPACA’s individual mandate 
places a federal regulatory requirement on individuals to purchase health insurance 
in order to promote social justice for all. Comparable regulatory requirements were 
placed on privately owned restaurants to prevent them from practicing racial 
discrimination by denying people the right to eat.163 Federal regulations under the 
Commerce Clause may also prohibit access to medical marijuana necessary to 
relieve unbearable pain.164 As a practical matter, it is absolutely crucial that Congress 
be granted the freedom and discretion to create a national solution to alleviate a 
national problem, like healthcare reform, by utilizing the individual mandate.165 
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The Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of PPACA’s individual mandate put forward a 
thinly veiled goal to rollback the enumerated Commerce Clause power of 
Congress.166 To roll back this power, the Eleventh Circuit virtually ignored Supreme 
Court precedent standing for the notion that federal laws enacted by Congress are 
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity.167 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit 
exceeded its judicial authority when it failed to follow the Supreme Court’s 
instruction to “invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that 
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”168  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
rationale for rolling back the federal commerce power of Congress without adequate 
justification, effectively concluding that Congress exceeded its enumerated authority 
under the Commerce Clause demonstrates a lack of judicial restraint and respect for 
the institutional role of Congress.169  
When Congress exercised its enumerated power under the Commerce Clause, its 
legislative judgments, which were rationally supported and not otherwise prohibited 
by the Constitution, were entitled to judicial deference.170 By subjecting Congress’s 
exercise of its enumerated commerce power to the rational basis standard of judicial 
review in the current public policy debate over healthcare policy, a court 
demonstrates respect for the traditional expertise of Congress involving a 
commercial enterprise under a power expressly delegated to Congress by the 
Constitution.171 When Congress affirmatively acts via its enumerated commerce 
powers, the rational basis standard of judicial review is both necessary and proper. 
Such a high level of deference is required because Congress, unlike the judicial 
branch, is accountable to the people when addressing controversial subjects, like 
accessibility to healthcare coverage.172  
By rejecting the individual mandate, the Eleventh Circuit effectively ignored 
over 75 years of precedent that granted Congress authority, under the Commerce 
Clause, to regulate areas of the national economy that require a Congressional 
solution.173 It is undisputable that it is an issue that an estimated 5 million people 
lacked healthcare insurance coverage.174 More troubling is that only 63% of 
uninsured individuals’ healthcare costs are paid for, leaving the remaining, $43 
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billion in 2008, unpaid.175 The unpaid amount is then indirectly paid for by insured 
individuals through increased premiums which are invoked by health insurance 
providers – an average of over $1,000 a year per family.176 The individual mandate 
sought to provide a solution to this issue in the national economy, and as granted 
under the Commerce Clause, Congress acted within its right to regulate.177 
In Gibbons, the Court noted that Congress held unlimited power under the 
Commerce Clause, except for those expressed in the Constitution.178  With this 
strong presumption of Commerce Clause precedent giving Congress wide latitude to 
regulate the national economy, Congress has already regulated the insurance 
industry, as observed in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, as well as 
private health insurance policies, healthcare providers, and other provisions 
concerning the consumption of healthcare services.179 Regulation of healthcare 
services includes the regulation of prices or price-fixing for healthcare service 
expenditures in order to stimulate commerce.180 Therefore, it has been previously 
established that Congress has the authority to regulate the healthcare industry 
generally and health insurance specifically.181   
Eventually, everyone is certain to participate in the healthcare market as a 
consumer.182 Without PPACA’s individual mandate, an individual may easily opt out 
of purchasing health insurance; however, a person may never opt out of the 
healthcare services market.183 No individual can simply “opt out” of contracting an 
unavoidable illnesses or having a health emergency in the future, although in rare 
instances such may be the case for an individual.184  Consequently, it is “a question 
of when and how individuals will consume and pay for such services, not whether 
they will consume them.”185 The Eleventh Circuit described PPACA’s individual 
mandate as a constitutional grant of general police power to Congress.186  Those who 
avidly oppose PPACA, however, claim that by allowing the individual mandate, 
Congress would have unlimited power under the Commerce Clause to impose far-
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reaching requirements on individuals.187  However noble and legitimate these 
concerns on individual liberties may be, for the purposes of American constitutional 
law, those arguments are untenable because PPACA’s individual mandate regulates 
an activity that is inherently economic in nature and does not seek to regulate outside 
of that narrow scope.188  
Relying on Lopez and Morrison, The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress 
exceeded its regulation authority under the Commerce Clause with PPACA’s 
individual mandate. Both Lopez and Morrison held that Congress exceeded its 
Commerce Clause regulating authority;189 however, the Eleventh Circuit majority 
could not have been more incorrect in its analysis.  Lopez and Morrison tackled 
issues that were non-economic in nature.190 Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act, which criminalized possessing a firearm in public school zones.191 The 
Act contemplated by the Supreme Court in Lopez was unrelated to commerce and 
economic activity due to the lack of any legitimate connection between the action 
(possessing a firearm in public schools) and the economic activity Congress sought 
to control.192  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Morrison invalidated criminal 
sanctions for gender-motivated felonious acts of violence, another non-economic 
regulation passed by Congress.193  
Contrary to the issues addressed by the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison, 
regulating the cost-shifting of $43 billion by uninsured individuals in our healthcare 
marketplace is economic in nature.194 The Supreme Court, if it was to rely on Lopez 
and Morrison, would have to rely on an unacceptable chain of reasoning to find a 
nexus between regulating criminal conduct having a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.195 But, PPACA’s individual mandate has a substantial economic 
connection to regulation of the healthcare marketplace and interstate commerce. 
There is direct link between the individual mandate’s requirement to purchase 
healthcare insurance or pay a tax penalty and the regulatory scheme of healthcare 
services.196   
An individual’s failure to purchase health insurance coverage and that 
individual’s subsequent inability to pay for healthcare services incurred affects 
commerce because those participating in the health insurance market unavoidably 
will pay for those unpaid services through increased premiums.197 Unlike Lopez and 
                                                          
 187 Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision 
Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591, 596 (2011).   
 188 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1352 (Marcus, J., dissenting). 
 189 Id. at 1285. 
 190 Id. at 1352 (Marcus, J., dissenting). 
 191 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
 192 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1352  (Marcus, J., dissenting). 
 193 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 603 (2000). 
 194 Florida, 648 F.3d at 1352 (Marcus, J., dissenting). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Siegel, supra note 187, at 607.     
48 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 26:29 
 
Morrison, PPACA’s individual mandate is a comprehensive statute essential to 
regulating the economic issues underlying healthcare services and is not a regulatory 
scheme invoking social interaction or criminal prohibitions.
 198  
Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence is unharmed, despite PPACA’s 
individual mandate being upheld.
199
  Lopez and Morrison lack any facts concerning 
economic activity within Congress’s constitutional reach to regulate.200 The Supreme 
Court in those two cases recognized this, and both statutes were invalidated as 
impermissible actions of Congress.  The limitations applied in those cases do not 
apply to PPACA’s individual mandate, which is inherently economic in nature.201 
When Congress regulates inherently economic activity that substantially impacts the 
interstate healthcare market or interstate healthcare insurance, that regulation is 
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity under a rational basis standard.202 
Therefore, Congress’s conclusion that PPACA’s individual mandate is an essential 
component to effectively and efficiently regulate the healthcare market or health 
insurance industry is permissible under the Commerce Clause.203 
The Eleventh Circuit decision invalidating PPACA disregards Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority by attempting to heighten the level of judicial scrutiny 
required when reviewing the constitutionality of acts of Congress.204  The evidence 
regarding unpaid healthcare services directly attributed to the amount of uninsured 
Americans reveals the need for PPACA’s individual mandate. PPACA’s regulatory 
scheme concerning America’s health insurance industry meets the rational basis 
scrutiny required of Congress when it acts to regulate interstate commerce.205 
Inevitably, uninsured individuals will consume healthcare services or products, and 
the subsequent unpaid healthcare costs will be shifted to those individuals who 
participate in the health insurance market.206 Years of judicial precedent demonstrate 
Congress has broad authority to regulate the interstate marketplace,207 and rejection 
of PPACA’s individual mandate limits Congress’s presumptive rational basis 
Commerce Clause authority to regulate the health insurance and healthcare 
markets.208 
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius argues that the Commerce Clause 
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authorizes Congress to enact the individual mandate.
 209 Similar to offering elderly 
and survivorship benefits in the 1930’s, offering heightened accessibility to the 
healthcare marketplace in 2012 is permissible under the Commerce Clause.  Plainly, 
it is untenable to conclude that the PPACA violates the Commerce Clause.210 When 
enacting the Social Security Act, Congress exercised its Commerce Clause authority 
to establish a federal system making available monthly benefits to previous wage 
earners now retired, and to their survivors.211 Unquestionably, the Commerce Clause 
grants Congress the ability to approve a similar scheme in healthcare. Congress 
decided, as an alternative, to preserve a pivotal role for private insurers as well as 
state governments.212 “According to The Chief Justice, the Commerce Clause does 
not permit that preservation. This rigid reading of the Clause makes scant sense and 
is stunningly retrogressive. Since 1937, our precedent has recognized Congress' large 
authority to set the Nation's course in the economic and social welfare realm.”213 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the rationale of the majority opinion in Florida v. Department of 
Health and Human Services unquestionably reveals the Lopez Commerce Clause 
enumerated powers analysis was not utilized as a rubric to protect the presumptive 
validity of PPACA’s individual mandate under the rational basis standard.214 The 
Lopez rationale of rolling back Congress’s expansive Commerce Clause power was 
misused by the majority opinion in the Eleventh Circuit.215 The misuse of Lopez 
occurred when the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly interpreted Lopez to represent the 
unfounded proposition that Congress must meet a standard higher than rational basis 
in order to enact PPACA’s individual mandate under the Commerce Clause.216 The 
Eleventh Circuit’s rationale for concluding that the individual mandate in PPACA is 
an example of Congress exceeding its enumerated authority under the Commerce 
Clause demonstrates a lack of judicial restraint and respect for the institutional role 
of Congress.217 When the Eleventh Circuit attempts to roll back federal Commerce 
                                                          
 209  Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609 (2012) (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins, and with whom Justice 
Breyer and Justice Kagan join as to Parts I, II, III, and IV, concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg, agreed with The Chief Justice that 
the Anti–Injunction Act does not bar the Court's consideration of this case, and that the 
individual mandate is a proper exercise of Congress' taxing power. Justice Ginsburg therefore 
join Parts I, II, and III–C of The Chief Justice's Opinion. Unlike The Chief Justice, however, 
Justice Ginsburg would hold, alternatively, that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to 
approve the individual mandate provision. Justice Ginsburg would also hold that the Spending 
Clause allows the Medicaid expansion precisely as Congress authorized it. Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 1321. 
50 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 26:29 
 
Clause power, without demonstrating that the individual mandate is not a rational 
attempt to regulate activity with a substantial impact on interstate commerce, it 
demonstrates judicial disrespect for Congress’s plenary power under the Commerce 
Clause.218 The Supreme Court’s rigid reading of the Commerce Clause in Florida v. 
Department of Health and Human Services is retrogressive and should only make 
scant sense to those who wish to roll back Supreme Court precedent acknowledging 
that Congress' extensive authority to regulate the Nation's agenda in the area 
addressing economic and social welfare policy since 1937.219 
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